Syria: Syrian activists propose an armed uprising

A growing number of activists in Syria are taking up arms to protect themselves from the government's violent crackdown that has claimed thousands of civilians lives since March.

They have begun setting up military councils in provinces across the country to create an organised command structure.

And the Syrian National Council, a leading opposition group, says it will logistically back the armed uprising to prevent more civilians from being killed.

Zeina Khdor reports from Beirut.

Middle East: Censorship Changes Colours

Republished permission Inter Press Service (IPS )copyright Inter Press Service (IPS)
http://www.ipsnewsasia.net/ and http://www.ipsnews.net/

Censorship Changes Colours

By Simba Shani Kamaria Russeau

CAIRO, Jan 27, 2012 (IPS) - Attempts by regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to suppress the flow of information during the region's pro-democracy uprisings has led a higher number of journalists killed, attacked or arrested.

"At the onset of the Arab Spring, the control of information was a key priority for the authorities," Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) Middle East and North Africa researcher, Soazig Dollet told IPS.

"Governments tried to ensure a complete media blackout regarding the security force's repression of these protests by cutting mobile and Internet access while also attacking local and international journalists."

Tunisia’s uprising in January 2011, which led to the ouster of former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, gave birth to a wave of protests that quickly spread across the Arab world. On Jan. 25 Egypt followed suit by calling for the end of president Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule.

Given Egypt and Tunisia's success, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) such as Bahrain, Morocco, Libya, Yemen and Syria launched their own revolutions.

Although journalists played a crucial role reporting on the demonstrations and their repression, they also faced increasing risks as authorities attempted to crack down on the spread of information.

According to a Reporters sans Frontières report, at least 20 journalists were killed and 553 attacked or threatened - making MENA region one of the most dangerous for media professionals.

"Regimes in all countries that witnessed popular uprisings initially tried to black out information," executive director of the Samir Kassir Foundation, Ayman Mhanna told IPS.

"They started with blocking access to social networks like Facebook and Twitter, but then realised they should open up these sites to be able to monitor who’s writing what. Then they restricted access to foreign and independent journalists, unless they were totally under their control.

"The situation got a bit better except in Syria and Bahrain. In Syria, foreign journalists are only sneaking in, unless they accept to work under the control of the authorities, which does not guarantee their security; Gilles Jacquier’s death is an example.

"In Bahrain the situation is very difficult. The Gulf Cooperation Countries have a vested interest in blocking the revolution in Bahrain…All opposition media outlets are now censored in Bahrain and the pro-regime media completely distorts the information."

Human rights advocates have long characterised the Middle East and North Africa as being one of the most heavily censored regions in the world due to the establishment of repressive measures such as regulations and laws, harassments and detention, surveillance and monitoring, and even physical restrictions.

Laws and regulations like the press and publication law, emergency laws, penal codes, Internet-specific laws and telecommunications decrees have been used to permit the jailing of journalists for undermining the reputation of the state as a means of suppressing reports of corruption or scrutiny of government officials.

In Bahrain, authorities use the 2002 Press Law to impose censorship rules. Syria’s penal code allows for the criminalisation of spreading news abroad. In addition, both Syria and Egypt maintain emergency laws that grant authorities the power to search and detain journalists, media professionals and political activists without due process.

"During the Mubarak era, many forms of censorship were taking place. Calling editors-in-chief, stopping particular editions from being printed, confiscating some daily issues, harassing journalists and taking their belongings," Ramy Raoof, online media officer for the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights told IPS.

"These things are still taking place today but by different officials. Instead of people from the Ministry of Interior it happens by people from the military system. For example, on 22 February 2011, a letter from the Army was sent to Egyptian newspapers telling them in brief: Not to Publish Any Content About the Military."

"Press codes, in most Arab countries, pretend to respect press freedom but in fact leave wide avenues for regimes to violate them. Some articles, such as ‘demoralising the nation’ have been recently widely used in Syria. Accusing activists of treason and cooperation with foreign enemies is another accusation that is frequently used," adds Mhanna.

One year later, however, as several countries work towards building a democratic future while others continue to demonstrate, the freedom for journalists to do their jobs remains a difficult task.

"Now there are less red lines and journalists can express their opinions more freely because they broke the ‘fear barrier’," Mhanna said. "However, expressing an opinion has also become more dangerous, whether in countries where the revolutions didn’t manage to overthrow the regime, or in countries where religious extremists are on the rise.

"So in a way, censorship changed in nature. Now it’s the aftermath of what a journalist writes or says that can be dangerous."

Space: Official conclusion of Phobos Ground crash shocks scientists

Source: Pravda.ru

Official conclusion of Phobos Ground crash shocks scientists

The interdepartmental committee, which investigates the reasons of the breakdown of Russia's Phobos Ground spacecraft, presented the basic version of the accident. Sources at the space industry told Interfax said that, most likely, the spacecraft did not enter the departure trajectory to Mars due to the influence of plasma formation in the magnetosphere of the Earth. Scientists doubt, though, that this theory explains what exactly happened on board Phobos Ground.

Versions of the external impact have been voiced before. Specialists particularly blamed a US radar. American officials strongly rejected the accusations and refused to take part in the investigation of the space accident.

The results of the work of the intergovernmental committee were delivered to Russia's Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos. The official announcement of the reasons of the accident is to be made on Sunday, Jan. 29.

The conclusion about the influence of the plasma formation was made as the scientists analyzed the launch date of the spacecraft - November 9 - and the powerful X-class solar flare, which took place on November 4. The solar activity was abnormal during that period. The flare was accompanied with the strong emission of the coronal mass (plasma) that weighed several billions of tons. The flare triggered a number of magnetic storms, which lasted for weeks.

The scientists found seven dangerous zones on the Sun as they were studying the phenomenon. The specialists concluded that it was the largest group of formations on the surface of the Sun since 2005. The square of the largest spot on the star was 17 times larger than the square of the Earth.

The experts thus concluded that the Russian spacecraft incidentally found itself in the cloud of plasma, and the electronic equipment of the vehicle went out of order.

Some Russian scientists said, though, that the official conclusion of the committee was not true to fact.

"This is impossible. Plasma formations of this type may appear at certain altitudes. As a rule, they are much weaker than would be required for exerting any influence on the spacecraft," Marat Deminov, a chief scientist with the Institute of Earth Magnetism, Ionosphere and Radiowaves Propagation (IZMIRAN), told RIA Novosti news agency.

According to the professor, plasma formations may appear because of rocket emissions, but they are very weak. In addition, the USA's HAARP in Alaska can warm up plasma in the ionosphere. However, the power of the ionosphere will not be enough to affect the electronic equipment inside the satellite anyway, the scientist added.

Natural plasma formations are incapable of affecting spacecraft, the scientist believes. "When they talk about the plasma formations, which are not connected with human activities, this is purely fiction. There are no facts to prove that," Deminov stated.

In addition, scientists say that the situation with the solar activity could not affect the Phobos Ground either. Sergei Gaidash, the chairman of the department of space weather forecasts with IZMIRAN, told RIA Novosti that space weather for November 9 was normal.

"All was normal. There was nothing that could affect Phobos. We sent that document to the committee," Gaidash said.

D.R. Congo: DRC Army's Loyalties Uncertain Around Election

This article originally appeared in the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
DRC Army's Loyalties Uncertain Around Election

Former armed groups drafted into national force continue to follow their own agendas, denting hopes of long-term stability.

By Mélanie Gouby - International Justice - ICC

Recent elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, have highlighted the continuing power struggles between former rebel groups integrated into the Congolese army, prompting concerns about future stability and the government’s lack of control over military units in the east of the country.

According to a United Nations report published at the end of December, former armed groups are continuing to pursue their own partisan interests, even though when they have officially been integrated into the DRC armed forces, known as FARDC,. In the November 28 presidential and parliamentary elections, such militias took sides and sought to influence the outcome.

The report says that members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP, an ethnic Tutsi-dominated armed group with close ties to Rwanda, secured high-ranking positions within the FARDC in exchange for supporting the incumbent Joseph Kabila’s successful bid for re-election.

The CNDP was integrated into the FARDC in 2009, following a deal between Kabila with the Rwandan government in which the force’s commander Laurent Nkunda was arrested. In return, Rwanda sent troops into Congolese territory to fight the FDLR, an ethnic Hutu militia that it still sees as a threat to its security.

Following the deal, the CNDP was divided into a military force that was integrated into the FARDC, and a political wing which put forward parliamentary candidates and backed Kabila for the presidency.

The alliance, however, is at best one of convenience.

“The CNDP was promised positions in the government but those never came,” a UN expert told IWPR on condition of anonymity. “Now they are strengthening their political power by making sure their candidates to the parliamentary elections are elected and by bringing a Rwandophone [Kinyarwanda-speaking, in this case Tutsi] population to the Kivu region to assert their control and no longer be a minority.”

According to Jason Stearns, a Congo analyst and author of the book “Dancing in the Glory of Monsters”, “The CNDP-Kabila alliance is clearly an opportunistic one. Many of the officials on either side hate each other, although many others are in business with each other.

“But while it will surely see a lot of turbulence, it is more durable than the previous arrangement, which had them trying to defeat each other.”

Meanwhile, many former combatants continue to see CNDP commander Bosco Ntaganda, as their real leader, not President Kabila.

“Despite further reorganisation... [FARDC] is still divided by parallel chains of command, with many former CNDP soldiers still loyal to General Bosco Ntaganda, who has encouraged them to resist attempted reforms,” the UN report said.

Ntaganda is wanted by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges.

In early 2011, attempts were made to restructure the FARDC to mix former CNDP members with other soldiers so as to dilute their old loyalties. However, the CNDP seems to have taken advantage of the effort, increasing rather than losing its control of North Kivu region, where Ntaganda still holds sway.

“Nothing can be done without Ntaganda’s consent,” the UN expert told IWPR. “His troops are deployed where his personal economic interests are, in particular the mines. But since September, they have also been involved in political intimidation. The CNDP has prevented other parties from campaigning and have forced several politicians to join them.”

VOTER INTIMIDATION

As the results of the parliamentary elections emerge, tensions remain high in both North and South Kivu regions.

“Everyone is talking a lot, but we have seen little action since the presidential election,” a FARDC officer said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Of course, the parliamentarian election is closer to home, but it is uncertain what the reactions will be. That feel of uncertainty itself is driving tensions high.”

The Supreme Court in Kinshasa confirmed Kabila’s re-election on December 17, amid allegations by the opposition and the international community that the elections were not free and fair.

In the parliamentary polls, 20 out of the 25 seats declared so far in North Kivu (which elects 47 of the 500-seat national parliament) have gone to Kabila’s presidential majority, leading to an outcry from opposition and civil society groups that the results are not credible. Final results were expected on January 13, but the national election commission has postponed this indefinitely.

In the Masisi district of North Kivu, IWPR interviews indicate there was significant pressure on voters to pick Kabila in the election.

“The CNDP forced people in Masisi to vote for Joseph Kabila,” a member of a local NGO who asked to remain anonymous said.

IWPR reporters who attended polling stations across Masisi noted a visible military presence at polling stations, and CNDP soldiers inside as well.

The New York-based advocacy group Human Rights Watch also reported a CNDP presence at polling stations, and cases of intimidation of voters.

“These elections are not like the one in 2006, where people were electing candidates of their choice,” a peasant farmer in Mushaki, a town in Masisi, told IWPR. “That is not the case now in Masisi. There is a lot of harassment and we are forced to vote for a certain candidate.”

OTHER ARMED GROUPS VYE FOR POSITION

The privileged position granted to the CNDP, coupled with the implicit deal with Kigali that lies behind it, is driving recruits towards other irregular armed groups, as locals feel the need to defend themselves against what they see as the threat of domination by people of Rwandan origin.

Whether integrated into the FARDC or still operating as maverick forces, these groups also have vested interests in the outcome of the parliamentary election, which could fuel tensions among them.

The Mai Mai, the collective term for several disparate paramilitary groups claiming to defend particular ethnic communities, are unhappy about how much influence that the CNDP has won within the national army and in Kivu.

Two Mai Mai groups, the Mai Mai Sheka and the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo, APCLS, clashed last June as they tried to gain control over the electorate in Mutongo. The former group’s leader Ntambo Ntaberi Sheka was standing as a parliamentary candidate in Walikale district, and his group wanted to get people to enrol as voters there, while the APCLS wanted them to vote in its own stronghold, Masisi.

“The fight was started by [APCLS leader Colonel Buingo Karairi] Janvier, who wanted the people of Mutongo to enrol in Masisi,” Séraphin Nugulu, the chief of the Ihana area, told IWPR after the fighting. “Of course Sheka could not let that happen.”

The result of the fighting was that thousands of people ended up being displaced and unable to enrol for the elections at all.

The ACPLS claims to represent the interests of the Hunde ethnic group, in particular against “Rwandaphone” encroachment.

The UN report said the APCLS wanted to increase enrolment in Masisi, an area where “limited Hunde representation is threatened by the increasing strength of… Tutsi politicians of the CNDP”.

A number of armed groups including the APCLS have made statements implying that they would resort to violence in the event that their preferred candidate did not win, sparking fears of fighting once the parliamentary results become known.

A diplomatic source watching developments in eastern Congo said, “It will be interesting to watch the reactions of such groups as the ACPLS in the near future, if the CNDP keeps its control over large areas of North Kivu and the government does not do anything about it.

The source added that such resentments, stemming from the parliamentary polls, could have a bigger impact on the Kivu regions than the outcome of the presidential election.

ARMY GRUMBLING

Meanwhile, frustrated with what they perceive as Kinshasa’s favouritism towards the CNDP, sections of the FARDC secretly supported opposition parties in the elections. Regular FARDC soldiers who once fought against the rebel group still view it as the enemy, while those former Mai Mai groups that have been incorporated into the army are resentful of the privileged position the CNDP has won.

Several FARDC officers told IWPR that the perceived government favouritism towards the CNDP had prompted some in the army to desert and join rebel groups, or at least pass them weapons. Others had been involved in voter intimidation.

The UN report confirmed that loyalties were fracturing within the military.

“Perceiving their further marginalisation within the security services, many non-CNDP senior army officers, including those integrated from former Mai Mai groups, have begun to provide discreet support to armed groups, both for their own private economic gain as well as to position themselves prior to post- election instability,” it said.

The sense that ex-CNDP servicemen get better conditions than the poorly-paid regulars is particularly likely to spark mutinous feelings.

“My soldiers are paid 50 US dollars a month, sometimes nothing,” said a FARDC officer speaking on condition of anonymity. “As a captain I am paid 61 dollars a month. We have weapons. It’s a pressure cooker waiting to explode.”

Mélanie Gouby is an IWPR journalist and multimedia producer who has been leading IWPR’s transitional justice project in eastern DRC.

Indonesia: An Indonesian’s hopes for the US role in the Asia Pacific

An Indonesian’s hopes for the US role in the Asia Pacific

by Singgih Nugroho

Salatiga, Indonesia - US President Barack Obama's November visit to Bali in November 2011 to attend the 19th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summits was his second official visit to Indonesia in his role as president. In November 2010 he gave a speech at the University of Indonesia in which he praised the country for successfully reconciling Islam and democracy, as well as its ability to manage diversity democratically. This praise was undoubtedly welcomed by many. However, many Indonesians find these words at odds with recent US policy in the region and feel that more must be done to improve relations between the two countries.

In late November, before his arrival in Bali, Obama announced the deployment of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force of 2,500 in Darwin, Australia – a mere 800 kilometres away from Indonesia – for the first time since World War II.

This decision surprised and worried many Indonesians. While most analysts and politicians believe the move is related to the United States’ relationship with China, some Indonesians fear that the presence of US troops will create tensions and mistrust between the two countries. For many, a US military presence so close to their shore is at the very least seen as too close for comfort.

At the summit in Bali, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa commented on such concerns by stating, “What I would hate to see is if such developments were to provoke a reaction and counter-reaction precisely to create a vicious circle of tension and mistrust or distrust."

Sadly this mistrust is already rising. Diplomats in Indonesia, the United States and Australia have all stated publicly that the deployment is not aimed to create further tensions in the region and is purely for humanitarian disaster-management purposes. However, this explanation has generally been met with disbelief in Indonesia, where analysts and observers continue to voice suspicions regarding the motives of the troop deployment.

This situation has had consequences at the grassroots level in Indonesia.

The US troop deployment feeds into the propaganda perpetuated by radical groups in Indonesian that the United States has imperialistic aims when it comes to Indonesia. This could in turn make it more difficult for Indonesian civil society to stand up against exclusive ideologies and promote greater pluralism domestically.

In the Asia Pacific region, many people see diplomatic and political means as being equally important to the end goals. Accordingly, most Indonesians share US interests in the region, but disapprove of using demonstrations of military might to achieve them.

Many Indonesians admire the US government system, business community and culture and have no issue with the American public in general. At the same time they disapprove of some elements of American foreign policy, especially those they see as imposing a double standard when it comes to upholding human rights on the one hand, and business and corporate policies on the other.

Opportunities to truly understand the United States and Americans are only experienced by a minority of Indonesians.

This gap could be overcome if both sides were more sensitive to each others’ values and frames of reference. Media and public figures on both sides could refrain from presenting half-baked and poorly informed opinions as fact. Diplomatic approaches between the two governments could encourage more direct cooperation between American and Indonesian citizens at several levels. These could take the form of government, educational and civil society exchanges that would allow Americans and Indonesians to share their experiences of everyday life and see one another with human faces that are kind, fair, friendly and considerate.

Scepticism and mistrust continue to fill the pages of Indonesian papers with regards to US actions in Darwin. But if leaders on both sides can use this as an opportunity to look at the US-Indonesian relationship more carefully, it could result in the building of new connections based on common interests and good will rather than suspicion or fear.

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* Singgih Nugroho is a researcher at PERCIK (The Institute for Social Research, Democracy and Social Justice) in Salatiga, Indonesia and a 2011 participant of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) on Pluralism and Democracy. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).

Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews)www.commongroundnews.org. Copyright permission is granted for publication.

Kyrgyzstan: Organized Crime Flexing Muscles in Prisons

Originally published by EurasiaNet.org

Organized Crime Flexing Muscles in Prisons

by Chris Rickleton

EurasiaNet.org

A massive hunger strike in Kyrgyzstan’s prisons is bringing a long-time struggle over penal reform to a boil.

According to local human rights activists, the recent bout of unrest, which kicked off after a riot in a Bishkek holding facility January 16, has seen more than 6,000 inmates refuse food and nearly 2,000 sew their mouths shut, ostensibly to secure better living conditions. Yet the turbulence seems to be about something more than prisoners’ quality of life.

Newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev’s attempt to overhaul the poorly funded correctional system is meeting resistance from two deeply entrenched and hostile camps that are working together, say insiders. One constituency comprises local prison administrators, the other organized criminal groups. According to some observers, mafia networks reportedly subsidize prison facilities because the state can’t afford all the costs involved in housing the country’s roughly 9,000-strong prison population. There’s an incentive for criminal gangs to do so, as prisons represent a ready market for narcotics distribution.

Local administrators are reluctant to cede control over the correctional system to national agencies, while crime bosses are loathe to give up what are literally captive markets.

Recent events present a worrying echo of October 2005, when widespread prison riots brought the plight of state penal facilities into sharp and gruesome focus. Back then, the country had a new government talking up reforms, a new head of the penitentiary service (GSIN), and a criminal elite seeking to expand its influence. By the time order was restored, an inmate had shot and killed an MP and the GSIN chief while they were visiting a restive provincial jail.

Six years later, the political situation is eerily similar. The riot in Bishkek’s holding facility No.1 occurred the same week a new parliamentary coalition re-appointed hardliner Sheishenbek Baizakov as prisons’ tsar. A career policeman with experience fighting organized crime, Baizakov’s confirmation after 18 months as acting head pleased neither prison wardens -- who fear a challenge to their impunity -- nor criminal networks working inside the institutions, says criminologist and former Interior Ministry advisor, Kairat Osmonaliev.

Sensing “discord in the chain of command,” criminal groups incited unrest in the prisons to “test the system’s strength,” Osmonaliev told EurasiaNet.org. “[Penitentiary] disorder occurs in waves. Often things happening outside the prisons are more important than what is happening inside.”

Kadyr Tokoev, a former head of Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet-era prison system and current vice chairman of GSIN’s public oversight committee, says Kyrgyzstan’s jails are underfunded and dependent on external sources of income to maintain basic living conditions, a factor that strengthens the hand of organized criminal groups.

“In the late Soviet era, the prisons were self-financing. Every prison had its own production facilities. Inmates worked, and received a small wage. […] Now the government gives money from the state budget, but this allocation only meets 30 percent of the system’s requirements,” Tokoev told EurasiaNet.org, adding that the situation encourages low-ranking prison officials to engage in corrupt and criminal practices, including narcotics trafficking.

Officially, the state’s annual allocation to the correctional system is 300 million soms, or about $6.4 million. Tokoev says the obshak -- a communal money pot collected by and distributed among the prisoners themselves – pays for the necessities that the state can’t cover. An August 2006 report by the International Crisis Group found that senior crime bosses -- “thieves-in-law” -- ensure a steady flow of cash into the pots from outside prison walls, thus securing the unswerving loyalty of inmates during clashes with the government.

One alleged thief-in-law is Kamchi Kolbayev, reportedly living abroad, who has been linked to prison riots in the past. Insiders charge him with coordinating some of the unrest by telephone.

Now, as hunger strikers add a call for Baizakov’s ouster as prisons’ chief to their demands for greater freedom of movement inside prison colonies, Tokoev claims the standoff amounts to “criminal authorities versus the state.”

Baizakov says he has no plans to yield to strikers’ demands. “Let them all sew their mouths shut,” he reportedly quipped to local journalists on January 26.

Although supportive of attempts to reform the penitentiary system, Kyrgyzstan’s human rights ombudsman, Tursunbek Akun, says the spending shortfall weakens the government’s ability to play hardball with inmates. “While the government cannot afford to heat and repair the prisons, it isn’t in a position of power. While it isn’t in a position of power, it should try to find a compromise,” Akun said.

Nevertheless, having spent the last week touring penal facilities, Akun admits fear, rather than a desire for material benefits or concessions, is driving the strike. “Part of the problem is that the government doesn’t have a common language with prisoners,” Akun told EurasiaNet.org. “If they did, they would realize that many are afraid. We spent the last two days going around the colonies and asking people why they are on hunger strike. Some even said to us, ‘This is an order.’”

Editor's note:

Chris Rickleton is a Bishkek-based journalist.